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IINTRODUCTION
This paper is a discussion of various statistical procedures projecting
future business capital requirements. The forecasting of what business
activity or use of funds actually will be at some specified date is a quite dif-
ferent undertaking, important in its own right, but not under discussion
here. Our attention will be confined to the problem of estimating business
capital requirements associated with assumed levels of over-all economic
activity, and in particular the problem of estimating what those require-
ments would be under such conditions of sustained maximum employment
(growth plus stability) as might reasonably constitute a guiding standard
or objective for economic policies.
We do not believe that any relation of investment to output, can, in
our type of economy, be made automatically self-sustaining. Our frame of
reference assumes the operation of a public policy which, in the interests
of general economic stability and growth, will aim also at keeping the rela-
tion of investment to output considerably more stable than it has been in
the past, or would tend to be in the absence of such policy. The policy-
makers therefore need to set up some standard or objective rate by which
to judge current investment levels..
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It seems obvious that the investment objective could be set so high, or
so low, as to nullify the chances of actually maintaining maximum produc-
tion over the long run. Somewhere between these impractical extremes is
a range in which the objective may be set with maximum chances of suc-
cess. If the policy-makers set an investment objective in that range, their
success is by no means assured, but at least they have started out on the
right foot. The objective itself may of course be altered in response to
changes in such basic conditioning factors as new technological develop-
ments, the consumption and savings propensities of the people, and extra-
economic (e.g., military) claims on resources.
Projection of "sustainable" levels and patterns of business investment
is simply one aspect of a more general analysis that 'seeks to determine
what pattern of distribution of national output and income is most con-
ducive to steady growth. In an economic model of this sort, business in-
vestment has to be related to other variables in a fashion consistent with
growth and reasonable stability. Such investment must provide adequate
expansion of capacity in line with the projectedgrowth of various types of
demand. It must be consistent with absorption of the various forms of
savings; and the price, cost and income relationships in the model must be
such as to yield appropriate incentives —inthe form of expanding markets
as well as profits —forthe projected level of business investment. To each
of these relationships, historical data provide useful though at present
inadequate guidance.
If any quantitative model of a sustainable maximum production econ-
omy is to make sense, the business investment component of it must at
least meet the tests implied by the relationships stated above. These rela-
tionships must work out to plausible and reasonably stable values so that
the model as a whole is neither inherently unrealistic nor unstable.
If a business investment projection is developed for such a model by
a "partial" approach, using just one of these relationships, it must subse-
quently be checked for consistency in regard to the other relationships as
well.
IIPROJECTION OF INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS:
BASIC APPROACHES
Most actual attempts at projecting business investment are of the partial
or one-sided character just mentioned. The four basic approaches which
have been used by various investigators in the field are briefly described
below.
1Considering business investment as essentially a means of maintaining
and expanding productive capacity, and relating it to the projected growthPROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 91
of demand for goods and services. This approach calls for (a) a provi-
sional projection, either of total production directly or of total final de-
mand, which is then translated by inter-industry analysis into projections
of production for individual industries; and (b) determination, from either
historical statistics or current technical investigations, of the quantitative
relation between business investment outlays and growth of capacity.
This approach starts from a projection of the gross national product,
as determined by trends in labor force growth, hours of work, and over-all
productivity. What remains is to estimate a relationship between output
(or growth in output) and gross investment. The crucial problem is how
stable or projectable that relationship is. This involves questions of (a) the
relation between expansion and replacement investment, and (b) the rela-
prominence of capital-using as against capital-saving improvements.
This approach is suited to projection of working capital as well as fixed
capital investment, i.e., in plant and equipment. Both fixed and working
capital may be regarded as essential factors determining the capacity to
produce. The principal difference between the analytical treatment of fixed
and working capital requirementsthat the former are generally esti-
mated on a gross basis and the latter on a net basis. The reason underlying
this difference is the slower turnover of fixed capital as compared with
working capital, which makes the financing of fixed capital replacement
much less automatic.
Use of this approach implies that in reconciling income and product
accounts at a full employment level of national income, income compo-
nents and saving will have to be adjusted to the level of investment as
prOjected, rather than the other way round.
2Considering investment as essentially a necessary offset to savings if
full use of resources is to be maintained. This approach calls for (a) a
provisional projection of income and savings for both businesses and indi-
viduals; (b) provisional assumptions regarding the government contribu-
tion to net savings or offsets thereto; and (c) provisional assumptions as
to offsets to savings, other than business investment. In this approach, the
"objective" for business investment appears as a residual offset to saving.
This approach faces up to the basic problem of maintenance of full
use of resources in the economy as a whole, but presents obvious difficul-
ties. In the present state of knowledge of individual consumption func-
tion, the flow of individual savings is notoriously hard to project. The
amount of business investment is dependent not only on profits (see
Approach.3, below) but on the disposition to invest, which is what one
is trying to project. Moreover, this approach calls for previous estimates
of all the offsets to saving other than business investment, and to that92 RESEARCHIN BUSINESS FINANCE
extent passes the buck. It gives no basis for any further breakdown of the
projected business investment total by industries or other categories.
3Considering business investment as essentially a reflection of current
or expected levels of profits. Proponents of this approach can point to a
relatively close correlation between short-run fluctuations in profits and
investment, as well as to the generally accepted proposition that invest-
ment is determined largely by profits in their twofold capacity as incentives
and sources of equity funds. Considerable econometric analysis has been
done by Tinbergen, L. Klein and others on defining the "investment
function" in terms of a relation to profits and other variables, with primary
emphasis on profits.
The chief difficulty with this approach when one seeks to apply
it to concrete secular projections as distinguished from cyclical forecasts
or purely conceptual model-building. It requires a provisional projection
of profits, which appear at present to be even more difficult to project
secularly on general assumptions than either total output or savings. And
it ignores variables, such as changes in the level of output, which may be
more fundamental than profits.
4Considering investment as, either empirically or logically, a secularly
stable fraction of total out put, and projecting it therefore as a percentage
of gross national product. Variants include the use of a regression relation
to gross national product, and the introduction of time as a second inde-
pendent variable.
This method is easy, but short on logic. Generally no reason is given
for assuming future stability of the investment/output relation, or any
steady trend in the relation, and the method often boils down to fairly
unsophisticated extrapolation.
One basic difficulty, shared to some extent by other approaches, is
that in projecting a "sustainable" investment/output relation for a hypo-
thetical state of continuous maximum employment, there is no comparable
past period on which to base, a relationship for such projection. The
relation applying in boom periods would seem too high, involving as it
does some liquidation of backlog demands and some accumulation of
surplus capacity and inventories; on the other hand, the average ratio
over all phases of the cycle may be too low.
We can now turn to our survey of various specific techniques for pro-
jecting business investment requirements. Section III will survey various
procedures based merely on the relation of investment to capacity require-
ments, without reference to the adequacy of funds or incentives for invest-
ment. Section IV will discuss procedures by which the profit incentive•PROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 93
factor in determining investment may be evaluated. Section V will discuss
procedures for relating projected investment to the utilization of saved
funds.
IIISOME SPEcIFIc PROJECTION PROCEDURES BASED ON
RELATION OF INVESTMENT TO GROWTH OF CAPACITY
In the discussion of procedures in this section, we shall give primary
attention to the projection of rates of gross investment in plant and equip-
ment. The below contains the little we have to say on proce-
dures for projecting working capital requirements.
WORKING CAPITAL OUTLAYS
Brevity On this topic is justified partly by the greater simplicity of. proce-
dural problems in the case of working capital outlays. By accepted ac-
counting conventions these outlays are treated on a net basis. In an
assumed secular context of stable prices, they represent exclusively capital
expansion rather than replacement. They are consequently more directly
relatable to projected trends of output growth than are the gross outlays
for combined replacement and expansion of fixed capital.'
In the present stage of knowledge, at any rate, it seems justifiable to
make secular projections of inventory accumulation and other working
capital uses of funds simply on the basis of historical ratios to sales,
modified by a time trend of such ratios. The time trend allows for assumed
continuation of the process of speeding and otherwise improving the han-
dling of materials and products. Further investigation of the trend of
business practices may give a better basis for modifying the prospective
time trend in the ratio, for both inventories and the other working capital
uses. There is also room for some improvement in the procedures for
translating over-all projections of national product into projections of
corporate sales or total business sales as a basis for applying the working
capital investment ratios.
Any projections of the total amount of working capital outlay required
in the interval between the present and some future date must of course
take account of possible present deficiencies or excesses in working capital,
relative to requirements at maximum employment levels of business. If,
for example, inventories are currently deficient by this standard, the inven-
1What hasbeen said applies, of course, only to secular projections under assump-
tions of stable growth. The cyclical behavior of working capital investment is even
more mercurial than that of plant and equipment outlays, and not easy either to
schematize in a realistic model or to forecast in concrete situations. Such problems
of cyclical behavior lie outside the scope of the present paper.94 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
tory investment needs for attainment of a normal or sustainable relation-
ship by some specified future date should include an allowance for making
up this deficiency, over and above normal growth requirements.
As we shall see later, the treatment of current deficiencies or "backlog"
requirements in fixed capital is not so simple.
FIXED CAPITAL OUTLAYS
We shall now consider some specific techniques used by various specialists
for projecting plant and equipment outlays on the basis of the kinds of
data now at hand. This survey makes no claim to be comprehensive. It
explicitly ignores two types of procedure that may be regarded as lying at
opposite extremes in regard to degree of detail.
One involves techniques of maximum simplicity, such as 1) extra-
polation of historical investment trends, 2) the use of ratios of investment
to gross national product, or 3) the regressions of investment on
gross national product and time. It does not seem profitable to us to discuss
such techniques as statistical operations. Furthermore, these simple,
"straightforward" methods have no clear rationale other than the maxim
that a simple method is to be preferred unless a complex one can prove its
superiority. To be sure, the more complex alternative methods we shall
describe here have not yet proved their superiority. We believe, however,
that they are designed to give improved insight into the determinants of
investment activity, and some of them should merit increasing confidence
as better underlying data come to hand. For that reason, it seems to us
appropriate to discuss these more sophisticated methods even before they
have acquired much utility as practical tools.
We are likewise omitting discussion here of the manifold devices and
problems involved in a really detailed synthetic projection of investment
needs. With sufficient resources it might be possible to build up com-
prehensive projections on an industry-by-industry basis, taking into
account the specific technical, financial and organizational problems of
each industry in turn. An elaborate study of this sort would at the same
time direct attention to such general questions as managerial criteria of
replacement and expansion policy, and the effects of changes in the
product-mix on aggregate relationships.
The problem of fitting a set of one-industry investment and output
projections into an internally consistent projection of the structure of the
whole economy is a formidable one, to which the work of Professor
Leontief and others on inter-industry relationships seems to hold the key.
This range of problems lies beyond the present paper, which will confine
itself to over-all methods. It might be noted, however, that some of thesePROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 95
methods are applicable to specific industries or sectors of investment,
where the necessary data are at hand.
1Gross vs. net investment. The analysis of plant and equipment outlays,
to determine functional relationships with output and income aggregates
for projection purposes, is complicated by the fact that outlays for struc-
tures and equipment are gross. They serve in part to enlarge capital and
in part to make up for capital consumption. Some procedures of projec-
tion attempt to take these two aspects separately into account. But the
data are scarcely adequate to justify very elaborate procedures.
The basic distinction between investment for replacement and invest-
ment for expansion can be set up in at least three different ways. We may
distinguish between the replacement and expansion of A, the net dollar.
value of productive facilities; B, the stock of productive facilities in "real"
terms, or C, productive capacity. In each case we get a different picture of
how large a part of a given gross investment is going into expansion. For
example, in the recent postwar years the investment needed to maintain
the stock of producers' real plant and equipment B has been more than
was needed to offset depreciation charges and thus maintain the net dollar
capital value of plant and equipment A. This was due of course to the
fact that the prices of new structures and equipment since the war have
been higher than the original cost of the structures and equipment being
written off. At the same time, it is quite likely, though difficult to prove,
that the investment required in the postwar period to maintain capacity C
was less than that required for maintenance of the physical volume of
structures and equipment B. This is the same thing as saying that the
average per-unit productivity of plant and equipment capital —measured
in physical terms, at capacity —hasincreased.
2Procedure based on of capacity expansion and replacement
outlays. All three of the breakdowns of gross investment suggested above
may ultimately be useful in analysis and projection of investment require-
ments, though only the one based on capacity C can be directly related to
output levels. Data showing investment outlays in relation to capacity
growth and maintenance are practically nonexistent and of doubtful
quality. The principal recent "series" in this field is that provided by the
McGraw-Hill surveys of plant and equipment outlays, in which a sample
of large manufacturers were asked to break down their actual and antic-
ipated expenditures into those for expansion and those for replacement
and modernization. This breakdown has been reported for actual 1948
outlays and for anticipated outlays in 1950 and in 1949-53. The same
respondents were asked to report their percentage increases in capacity96 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
for 1939-45, 1946-48, 1950, and 1949-53. Table 1 summarizes the
One possible approach to an estimate of plant and equipment invest-
ment requirements, under projected over-all output levels, would make
use of the McGraw-Hill findings on expansion and replacement outlays
as related to capacity.
For two periods —1950and 1949-53, both on the basis of reported
anticipations —itis possible to derive the ratios shown below:
1950 1949-53
(millions of dollars)
"Expansion" outlays, per percentage point of
capacity expansion on base 1939 =100 $440 $372
"Replacement and modernization" outlays,
per percentage point of capacity in place at
middle of period, on base 1939 =100 25 26
These ratios, suitably adjusted for changes in construction and equipment
prices, might be used to translate projected growth trends of capacity into
gross investment outlays. Results obtained by this procedure do not appear
unreasonable, and the logic of the procedure itself is superior to that of
other available methods. But until more extensive data are available,
it must be regarded as hardly more than an interesting experiment.
For one thing, we do not know how to weight combined construction
costs and equipment prices to get deflators for dollar figures on expansion
and replacement-and-modernization outlays. One can only surmise that
the weight assigned to equipment prices ought probably to be greater in
the replacement-and-modernization deflator than in the expansion de-
flator. But how much greater?
Nor do we know yet whether such ratios as those shown above .tend to
be stable or to show secular, cyclical, or other variations. The considerable
difference between the 1950 and 1949-53 ratios of expansion outlays to
capacity is not encouraging.
Finally, reporting of the purpose of actual or planned investment out-
lays is itself imprecise, and represents rough guesses by the respondents.
In a large proportion of cases a specific outlay yields expansion, replace-
ment and modernization all together, and no one knows just how to
allocate the costs.
These uncertainties may well diminish as data are accumulated for
more time periods and supplemented by studies in specific industries.
3Procedure based on direct relation of gross outlays to capacity expan-
sion. This represents an effort to sidestep the statistical difficulty of
segregating those parts of gross investment that are functionally related to
the growth and maintenance, respectively, of the capital stock. It consists
simply in relating total gross investment to growth in capacity.PROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 97
Table 1
SELECTED DATA FOR USE IN PROJECTIONS OF MANUFACTURING FAcILITIEs
OUTLAYSa
(dollar figures in millions).
1948 1950 1949-53
Total Plant and Equipment Outlays $8,160 $6,300 $28,630
Capacity expansion 3,430 2,200 7,430
Replacement and modernization 4,730 4,100 21,200
Percent of Total Plant and Equipment Outlays 100% 100% 100%
Capacity expansion 42 35 26
Replacement and modernization 58 65 74
Index of Capacity (1939 =100)
At beginning of period b 163.0C 156.0
At end of period 156.0 168.0 176.0
Average during period
ii 165.5 166.0
Percentage points of increase during period 5.0 20.0
Source: McGraw-Hill Plant and Survey Reports. Data for 1948 and 1949-53 were
estimated from the results Qf the November 1948 survey; data for 1950 were esti-
mated from the November 1949 survey.
available.
No data were collected for capacity expansion during 1949, but the index figure for
1950 assumes that capacity expansion was 7 percentage points on the
1939 base, or 4.5 percent of the capacity at the end of 1948. A 3 percent expansion
was reported as anticipated during 1950.
The procedure implies a close correspondence between the growth of
investment outlays related to capacity expansion and those not so related.
For this reason, if for no other, it wo,uld be inapplicable to year-to-year
historical data. It is obvious that the relative emphasis on investment for
expansion varies in the course of the investment cycle; but if there is a
fairly stable secular relationship, it may be of use. The purpose we here
have in mind is analysis and projection of sustained or secular growth.
Suppose, for example, the following conditions: (a) The growth trend
of capacity has a constant geometric slope; (b) capital outlays related to
capacity expansion are (after price deflation) secularly proportional to
the amounts of expansion produced; and (c) the remainder of capital
outlays is (after price deflation) secularly proportional to capacity.
We have already seen that the limited data so far yielded by the
McGraw-Hill investment surveys suggest that condition (c) and possibly
condition (b) may be found to apply. Condition (a) may also be close
enough to the truth for practical purposes. If all three conditions hold, it
would follow that total gross outlays (deflated) are secularly proportional
both to capacity and to the absolute rate of capacity growth.
In most practical applications, data on capacity are replaced by data
on output in selected years of approximately maximum use of capacity.98 - RESEARCHIN BUSINESS FINANCE
The "observations" consist then of output rates in a few widely spaced
peak peacetime years, and investment outlays for the intervening periods.
It is convenient to investigate the investment/capacity growth relation by
integrating both variables: i.e., by plotting a regression between output
and cumulative gross investment totals. Such a regression comes out
almost linear for the period 19 19-49, whether applied to the plant and
equipment outlays of all nonfarm producers or to those of manufacturers
alone.2
In other words, in successive intervals between years of full normal
capacity utilization, the volume of gross plant and equipment outlays per
unit of capacity increase is nearly constant. This suggests that a forward
projection of the expansion of output can readily be translated into terms
of the required gross capital outlays.
It is interesting to note that the results of this procedure, applied to the
projection of manufacturers' plant and equipment outlays, do not differ
much from those of the procedure previously described, which uses
the McGraw-Hill survey results. -
4Procedures based on relation of stock of capital to capacity. As an
alternative to the methods so far described, one may turn to the more
copious but less directly relevant data on real and monetary net capital
formation and capital consumption. The current dollar estimates rest
primarily on business accounting statements collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, .the Securities and Exchange Commission, and private
statistical services, while the deflated estimates have been prepared in large
part under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research
and more recently the Department of Commerce.
For projection purposes, the relation between gross investment and
total capacity can be broken down into: (a) a relation between capacity
and the physical size of the stock of capital (i.e., a projectable average
productivity of capital); or (b) a relation gross investment and
the size of the capital stock (which implies a projectable average life of
capital goods).
Proper treatment of these two relations presents some difficulty. It
appears that the capacity/stock-of-capital ratio, though it may have held
approximately constant for several decades in our history, has risen
markedly in the last twenty years or so, making prediction risky. More-
2Forindications of the results of applying this technique to manufacturers' plant
and equipment outlays, see Economic Report of the President, January 1949, pp.
55-56; and Business Needs for Venture Capital (a report by the Department of Eco-
nomics, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., for Electric Bond and Share Co., December
1949), pp. 1-6.
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over, it is not yet established whether this change is due to an increased
prominence of capital-saving improvements, a lengthened service life of
capital goods in relation to reported or estimated depreciation periods, or
to other causes.3
On theoretical grounds there is no particular reason to expect either
the average productivity or the average life of capital goods to remain
constant; and we do not yet know whether they can be expected to vary
along some reasonably steady, and hence projectable, trend.
Despite the complications involved in using bookkeeping figures in
projecting capital requirements, the fact remains that they are likely to be
by far the most extensive series of data available. It follows that efforts
should be continued to exploit them, by uncovering the relationships be-
tween these book figures, gross investment, and capacity. In this way it
may eventually be possible to make specific allowance for such baffling
factors as: (a) depreciation charges relative to obsolescence; (b) the
introduction of new and improved types of capital goods; and the (c)
effects of changes in the "mix" of capital goods.
The Slichter Method of projecting investment requirements is an interest-
ing variant of the foregoing approach, meriting some discussion.4
In the first place, Professor Slichter deals with the relation between
capital stock and capacity, not as aggregates, but on a per-worker basis:
relating the growth of labor productivity to the increase in the stock of
capital per worker. It is not clear to the present authors, however, just
what is gained by the per-worker approach. The required investment per
worker is subsequently multiplied by the number of workers to get total
investment requirements. Would not the same final result be secured by
working with aggregates? -
Inan interesting pioneer analysis of postwar investment needs made in 1946, Fred-
erick C. Dirks refers to "the increased technological effectiveness of new materials
and types of equipment in many lines." He does not attempt to allow for this factor
but regards it as more or less offset, during the period 1941-47, by "changes in the
dollar cost of like amounts of physical capacity." This statement seems to us to make
better sense if the words "plant and equipment" are substituted for "capacity," since
the effect of the suggested offsetting of biases would be to make the dollar cost of
like amounts of physical capacity more nearly constant. Cf. Frederick C. Dirks,
"Postwar Capital Formation and Its Financing in Manufacturing and Mining Indus-
tries" (Postwar Economic Studies No. 5, Private Capital Requirements, Federal Re-
serve Board, September 1946), p. 11.
'Partial descriptions of this procedure and its results appear in two articles by Sum-
ner H. Slichter: "Is America's Industrial Plant Too Small?" New York Times Maga-
zine, November 30, 1947, and "Will Recovery Continue?" Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, October 27, 1949.100 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
Professor Slichter concludes on the basis of historical data that the
secular growth of productivity (as measured by expansion of total full-
capacity output per employed worker) is more than proportional to the
growth of real plant and equipment per employed worker. He suggests
that a growth trend rising about 3 percent a year in the former series is
associated with a growth trend rising about 2 percent a year in the
latter. It would follow that the ratio of the aggregate stock of plant and
equipment to aggregate capacity is subject to secular decline.
This procedure is thus designed to incorporate a secularly progressive
allowance for capital-saving improvements, or increase in the average
productivity of capital. As yet, it is not clear whether such a trend, as
observed in the more recent historical estimates, reflects a real techno-
logical development or some deficiency in our measures of the size of the
capital stock, which in turn might be traceable either to the estimation
of capital consumption or to price deflation.
Note on backlog requirements: A conceptual point which plays an impor-
tant part in the published projections of both Professor Slichter and the
McGraw-Hill group is the vexing question of "backlog" requirements.
If a projection of future investment needs applies to a period following
one of inadequate investment, should the projection include an extra al-
low ance for making up accumulated deficiencies in plant and equipment?
These deficiencies can take either or both of the following forms: capacity
shortage —whenexisting facilities are inadequate to meet full-employment
demands under the standards of utilization for which those facilities are
designed; or excess age —whenexisting facilities are, on the average,
older than they would be over the long run on the basis of capital stock and
normal replacement projections.
Professor Slichter's extra backlog of investment need, which he has
estimated as in excess of $50 billion, is not explicitly broken down as be-
tween the two factors shown above. The following quoted description,
however, indicates that it leans heavily on the "excess age" factor:
There can be no doubt that the plant of industry is too small for the present
labor force and that much of it is old and obsolete.... Americahas more
machines and other equipment in place than we had in 1929. .. Ifone
measures capital, however ... byits unused life, American industry has
about one-fifth less capital per worker today [late 19471 than in 1929. An
expenditure of about $50 billion would be needed to raise capital per
worker to the leyel of 1929 and a considerably larger outlay to raise capital
per worker to the level which would be normal in view of the long-term
tendency of capital per worker to increase at the rate of about 2 percent
a year.5
"Is America's Industrial Plant Too Small?," NewYorkTimes Magazine, November
30, 1947, p. 8. Italics supplied. Mr. Friend states in his discussion of this paper thatPROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 101
The McGraw-Hill view on prospective capital requirements likewise
allows for making up a large accumulated deficiency, as indicated by the
following statements:
Business has made up less than a third of the backlog of needs for new
equipment accumulated during the depressed 1930's and during wartime.
That conclusion is based on calculations by S. Morris Livingston, Chief of
the National Economics Division, Office of Business Economics, United
States Department of Commerce. In a study which appeared in the June,
1949 Survey of Current Business, Livingston found that business expendi-
tures for new equipment followed a steadily rising trend of 3% per year
between 1869 and 1929. Between 1929 and 1945, actual purchases fell
$44 billion (in 1929 prices) below the level needed to continue the trend.
Since 1945, they have exceeded the trend by $14 billion (1929 prices).
Livingston's study supports the conclusion that business needs to maintain
the current rate of capital expenditures. If his figures, which are in 1929
prices, are converted to today's prices, and if construction needs are added
to his calculations of equipment needs, the deficit in capital expenditures
at the end of the war was close to $100 billion. On the same basis, current
capital expenditures are about $6 billion a year above the long-term trend
of expenditures in good years and bad. Consequently, to make up the
accumulated deficit, business capital expenditures would have to continue
at today's rate ($23 billion in 1949, equal to 9% of total national output)
for about 17 years.e
Both the Slichter and the McGraw-Hill treatments of "accumulated
deficencies" call for some critical appraisal. The basic point we
wish to make is that the two types of deficiency identified earlier as
"capacity shortage" and "excess age" are not of equal status.
Making good a capacity shortage does require a certain extra invest-
ment, sooner or later. This extra allowance is properly added to any
estimate of investment requirements based on secular growth and normal
replacement.
But the type of deficiency reflected in an abnormally high average age
of facilities may under some conditions call for no extra investment at all,
and in any event cannot be quantified as a requirement on the same
footing as the "capacity shortage" type. lithe retirement rate of facilities
can be held down to normal for a period approximating their life span,
then merely normal replacement outlays will by that time have
nated" the stock, i.e., eliminated the excess average age of facilities. If
the trend slope of equipment outlays was considerably steeper than the 3 percent
annual rate cited by Livingston. Projection of a steeper trend would of course make
the "accumulated deficit" come out even larger. Our statement above, regarding the
McGraw-Hill conceptual approach, remains valid.
Business Needs for Venture Capital (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., a report by the
Departmentof Economics, for Electric Bond and Share Co., December 1949), pp.
8-10. Italics supplied.102 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
that much temporary stretching of the life of plant and equipment is
feasible, then the "excess age" type of deficiency imposes no additional
capital requirement. It imposes merely the handicap of having to get along
temporarily on over-age facilities while waiting for the rejuvenation proc-
ess to work out. In practice, of course, a small part of total requirements
are physically non-postponable, and require some extra replacement in-
vestment. The extent to which additional super-normal replacements will
be made depends on business incentives and decisions in the particular
situation.7
The McGraw-Full staff has also attempted to measure the additional
backlog investment need on a somewhat different basis. With reference
to the relatively obsolete character of certain types of industrial equip-
ment, we find the following statements:
manufacturers [in 1950] will be spending $4.1 billion for replacement
and modernization. But at least part of this will only offset the wear and
tear of the year's operations. Nobody knows what a proper allowance for
this factor should be. If we assume that it is equal to the annual deprecia-
tion allowance that manufacturers charge up on their books, then we have
to subtract $4.5 billion. That leaves only $600 million out of this year's
capital expenditures for real modernization.8
In reporting on the condition of their plants and equipment last year, manu-
facturing companies indicated to McGraw-Hill that it would take almost
$20 billion to put their facilities into first class shape. They were able to
spend only about $1.5 billion on this kind of modernization in 1949. This
year, as plans stand, they will be able to spend only about one-third as much
[refers apparently to the $600 million in paragraph quoted above]. At that
rate, and even if all research and technical development were halted now,
it would take 40 years to completely modernize the nation's manufacturing
facilities.8
The McGraw-Hill reports refer to a concept of "real modernization"
outlays, apparently computed as the difference between total replacement
outlays and wear-and-tear. It should be clear from what has been said
above that this type of outlay represents, if anything, merely the accelera-
tion of the rejuvenation process and cannot legitimately serve as the basis
for estimating how long it might take to remove any existing excess-age
or deferred-replacement handicap.
TA note on policy: The. extent to which additional retirements are desirable in the
interests of the economy as a whole depends at least partly on whether resources are
being fully used or on whether the rate of investment is already higher than could be
sustained. Thus Professor Slichter argued in late 1947 that it was not then desirable
to seek further stimulation of business investment, despite the deficiency of plant and
equipment. See his Times article cited above, p. 76.
8"Industry's1950 Capital Spending Plans," Business Week, January 21, 1950, p. 78.
°BusinessPlans for New Plants and Equipment, 1950 (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,
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Nor can the "real modernization" figure legitimately be used to
measure progress toward another objective concept framed by the Mc-
Graw-Hill authors —theimprovement of facilities up to standards of "first
class shape." If this means that all plants in an industry are to be sub-
stantially as efficient as the best, it would seem practically unattainable in
a progressive economy. On the other hand, if it means bringing the
average quality of all productive facilities up to best 1950 standards, this
objective would presumably be attained in well under forty years merely
by virtue of normal replacement.
5Determination of obsolescence as a residual. We have aheady noted
the troublesome fact that no existing measures of the stock of capital
appear to bear a constant relation to capacity. Our difficulties result from
not knowing at what rate to allow for capital consumption, and from the
fact that "replacement" generally involves some net improvement.
This suggests that it might be fruitful to try to derive directly a rate of
"capacity attrition," ignoring altogether the more conventional concept
of capital consumption. Capacity attrition is lower than capital consump-
tion to the extent that replacement of capital (in the accounting sense)
increases capacity. Suppose we make these assumptions: (a) The shape
of the capacity attrition curve is constant and known; (b) the length
parameter of this curve is constant but unknown; and (c) data are avail-
able for real gross investment over a long series of years, and for capacity
in several different years spaced over the period covered.
For this method of derivation the first step is to build up a provisional
"stock" time series by adding the gross investment each year and making
a deduction for capacity attrition on the basis of the assumed attrition
function applied over some arbitrarily selected service life. This "stock"
series is then tested by comparing its secular behavior with that of avail-
able capacity measures, such as output in selected peak or near-peak
years. If the "stock" series rises faster, percentage-wise, than capacity,
it is then recomputed with a shorter service life; if the series rises more
slowly than capacity, it is recomputed with a longer service life. By
successive approximations, a service life can be found which (in conjunc-
tion with actual gross investment data and the assumed shape of the
attrition function) yields a "stock" series most closely approximating the
apparent actual secular behavior of capacity. Once this is found, it can be
used to translate projected future capacity requirements into gross invest-
ment requirements.
The term "stock" has been kept in quotes, since what this synthetic
series really measures is capacity, not the stock of capital in monetary or
real terms. Similarly, the capacity attrition rates determined by this104 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
method do not correspond to rates of capital consumption in bookkeeping,
Treasury, or real terms.
This method has two weaknesses. First, it rests on the unverified
assumption of a secularly constant capacity attrition schedule. Secondly,
it requires a very long continuous time series of deflated gross investment:
an initial historical value for the "stock" series has to be built up by ap-
plying the capacity attrition schedule over a previous period as long as
that of the assumed maximum service life. If that period is, say, twenty
years, then the stock series cannot begin until twenty years after the earliest
gross investment datum.'° Actually, the maximum service of plant and
equipment is probably much longer than that. Some structures are still in
use after many decades of service. For this reason it is probably desirable to
restrict application of the method to equipment alone, and to indulge in
some arbitrary "tucking-in" of the tail of the capacity attrition schedule,
with the hope that not too much error will be introduced thereby.
The Roos Method, closely related to the procedure just described, is one
earlier developed at the Econometric Institute. The only available de-
scription of it is here quoted from a paper by Dr. Roos:1'
Form the annual differences of domestic producers' durable equipment
expenditures minus reported depreciation and obsolescence; sum these
differences from 1918 to date to obtain a measure of net capital formation;
transform these expenditures to constant dollar figures by dividing by the
BLS index of metals and metal products.
The resulting series is without starting point and scale but otherwise mea-
sures changes in the physical level of plant assets. If one assumes that
technological changes are reflected in the prices of the goods, the index
may also be taken as a measure of changes in productive capacity. Then
by fixing any two points, it can be transformed to measure the capacity in
terms of any comprehensive production index such as the Federal Reserve
Board Index of Industrial Production. The Econometric Institute fixed
these points by assuming that in the peak periods of activity in 1919 and
in the early part of 1923, production was at a rate equal to 95 per cent of
capacity. The ratio of production to capacity was then computecL for each
year.
It will be observed that Dr. Roos accepted "reported depreciation and
101t is not possible to build the "stock" series upon any existing benchmark datum of
the stock of plant and equipment, since it is not supposed to behave like such a series.
The relation between stock of plant and equipment and capacity is assumed to be
changing. The outcome of the analysis would consequently depend on the quite
arbitrary choice of one of several benchmark dates for tying the synthetic "stock"
series to existing stock estimates.
"Papers and Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the American Economic
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obsolescence" as his capital consumption rate for equipment, and used no
fixed base datum for the "stock" of equipment.
Comparison of the Roos method with that described just before
brings out the fact that the shape of the "stock"-of-equipment series de-
pends on the capital consumption rate and on the base "stock" datum
chosen. If both were determined in advance, the entire "stock" series
would be determined, for the gross outlays series is given. If only the
capital consumption rate orthebase "stock" datum is determined at the
outset, the other of these two can be left free and made to depend on fitting
the trend of the "stock" series to some independent criterion of capacity,
such as peak-year output.
IVPROFIT INCENTIVES
Section III discussed procedures using growth in output as the basic
criterion for projecting a sustainable level of investment. Although profits
do not deserve the same status in the types of projections considered here,
there is still the important problem of estimating profit levels consistent
with particular projections of investment. This is one of the relationships
that must be taken into account in asking whether the investment pro-
jection is reasonable in the framework of a more comprehensive projec-
tion of the national product and national income. Another, the availability
of funds, is discussed in the following section. Other tests of consistency,
such as the relation of wage rates to investment, would involve us in a
general disèussion of economic projections —whichis beyond the scope
of this inquiry.'2
With respect to profit incentives there are three main questions to be
considered. The first is what the actual level of profits might be, given
the general assumptions of the full-employment projection. The second is
whether the relationship of this level of profits to projected investment is
reasonable from the point of view of incentives;. The third is whether
Mr.Friend, in his discussion of this paper, suggests that a rise in wage rates rela-
tive to equipment costs and interest rates "may tend permanently in the postwar
period to raise investment for a given level of [business] income."
We have not been able to test the importance of this factor. It may be worth
pointing out, however, that the upward trend of wage rates relative to the costs of
carrying equipment investment is by no means a unique postwar phenomenon (in
fact, from 1945 through 1948 the change appears to have been temporarilyin the
opposite direction). It is rather a secular trend, the effects of which have presumably
been expressed in the historical trend of investment outlays. Unless the trend is
shown to have accelerated, therefore, it would not seem proper to make any addi-
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profits are reasonably related to the other income shares, considering the
relation between income and consumption. Discussion of the last question
would take us too far afield.'3
Since the main purpose of full-employment projections is to attempt to
discover the structural relationships that might prevent the realization of
sustained growth, it is appropriate to begin with the "expected" level of
profits, rather than the level which might be most appropriate from the
point of view of incentives.
The following discussion is primarily the result of our thinking on
the pr9blem of projecting profit relationships for manufacturing. For other
broad categories, such as public utilities or trade, they might be quite
different. Even within manufacturing it is doubtful how far one can go
with broad generalizations.
A METHOD FOR PROJECTING THE "EXPECTED LEVEL" OF PROFITS
For relatively short-range full-employment projections, say a half-dozen
years or so, the most appropriate technique that we have been able to
find for projecting expected profit levels is a seemingly unsophisticated
one. This method involves projecting profits of an industry as a function
of output, taking for the base period a profit level associated with very
high utilization of capacity. The value of output is adjusted for assumed
changes in unit wage and material costs.'4 With sales determined, this
procedure amounts to projecting profits as a secularly constant percentage
of sales.
The method rests on the assumption that firms' pricing decisions can
be generally described in terms of fixed gross margins, i.e., by adding a fixed
percentage margin to unit variable costs. Such pricing is rational if
producers are uncertain both as to the shape of their demand schedules
and the reactions of competitors to changes in their prices.
Overhead costs being relatively stable, this type of pricing will result
in pronounced changes in profits with changes in the degree of capacity
utilization, but in relatively constant profit rates at given percentages of
Thisproblem will be discussed by Benjamin Kaplan in a paper being prepared for
the forthcoming Income Conference on economic projections.
Foran extended discussion of this technique and of the general assumptions in-
volved, see W. W. Leontief, "Wages, Prices and Profits," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, November 1946. It may be noted here that this technique does not involve
the assumption that all the coefficients remain constant; for a given industry, con-
stancy is assumed only in the relationship of total overhead costs to sales, and, as
will be indicated presently, in the relation of total "overhead inputs" to profits at a
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capacity utilization. At near-capacity operations, therefore, this type of
pricing policy would result in the trend of aggregate profits rising pro-
portionately to the trend of output, with the value of the latter adjusted
for changes in unit wage and material costs.
What basis is there for assuming that stable gross margins are a
structural characteristic of the economy? Kalecki has calculated gross
margins for the whole of manufacturing for the census years 1919-37.
For the relatively prosperous years of the period (extended by us to in-
clude 1939) the results are as follows:15
Gross Margin as








The data show rather moderate fluctuations from one census year to
the next, but an appreciable rise in the gross margin during the decade of
the twenties, and some decline in the late thirties. In terms of the hypoth-
esis outlined above, the trend may be partly explained by the relatively
high degree of capacity utilization in the late twenties. There is also reason
to believe that the observed changes in the margins are in some part due
to changes in census coverage, and to changes in the industrial composi-
tion of output.
After making the appropriate statistical adjustments Richard Ruggles
has calculated the gross margins for a number of smaller industrial groups.
Unfortunately, he has not yet published his results. Our impression of
them, which the reader is entitled to regard skeptically, is that in general
the margins for industrial groups are much more stable than margins
calculated for the whole of manufacturing. Historically, the changes do
not appear to show any systematic tendency. As a corollary to the relative
stability of gross margins, Ruggles found that price movements in various
industries could be very accurately predicted from changes in the weighted
average of their unit wage and material costs. In those industries where
there is a high degree of fabrication, price movements were closely asso-
ciated with changes in unit wage costs. In those industries in which raw
materials were important inputs, product prices moved nearly propor-
tionately with the material costs. Moreover, the results were quite inde-
Michal Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations (George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1939), pp. 22-23.108 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
pendent of differences in the market éharacteristics of' the industries
concerned.
Since the late prewar years it appears that gross margins have declined
rather appreciably. The 1947 census data do not permit gross margin
estimations for the whole of manufacturing. The following are calculations
based on comparable industry groups covering about 80 percent of value
of output in 1939:16
Census Year Gross Percentage Margin
1939 30.0%
1947 26.2
Though valid generalizations would certainly require a much more thor-
ough examination of the data than we have undertaken, calculations for the
broad industrial groups do not disclose that this decline was a result of
changes in industrial weights. Most of the heavy industries showed lower
margins in 1947 than in 1939. In textiles and apparel manufacturing,
however, they were somewhat higher in 1947.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that gross margins have not changed
materially during the postwar years. In the first place, the ratio of total
profits, depreciation, salaries and interest payments of manufacturing cor-
porations to their estimated sales (ah admittedly crude approximation of
the gross margin ratio) fluctuated only between 17 and 18 percent during
the years 1946 through 1949. Another bit of evidence is the association
of profits with changes in the degree of capacity utilization. Although we
have no reliable direct measure of the latter, available evidence indicates
that in general manufacturing capacity was more intensively utilized in
1947 and 1948 than in either 1946 or 1949. Profits, as a percentage of
sales, rose from 8.8 in 1.946 to about 9.8 in 1947 and 1948, and declined
to 8.0 in 1949.
Though the data referred to in this discussion, especially for the post-
war years, would'hardly support any firm conclusions, it appears reason-
able to use the working assumption that, during relatively short periods,
at least, gross margins will be constant. lit should be emphasized, however,
that relatively small changes in the gross margin, or changes in the rela-
tion of profits to the gross margin, can result in appreciable errors in
projecting an expected level of profits —evenunder the assumption of
stable growth.
One disturbing possibility is that gross margins may over the next
The higher margins for the portion of manufacturing covered than for the total
in 1939 is chiefly due to the omission of motor vehicles and parts, and steel works
and rolling mills, industries in which the margins are substantially lower than the
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several years tend to rise to the prewar levels. It is reasonable to assume
that the decline came about primarily through wartime price control, and
that for one reason or another manufacturers in general hesitated to take
full advantage of market after price controls were lifted.17
Possibly their restraint was due to their already sizable profits, and to the
fear that the boom might be short-lived. On the other hand, price control
may have introduced a real structural change in the economy.'8 For
purposes of relatively short-range projections, we assume that it has. In
any event this is not a question about which we shall have to speculate for
too many years.
THE EXPECTED LEVEL OF PROFITS FROM AN INCENTIVES VIEWPOINT
Much more speculative than estimating expected profit rates is judging
their consistency with a particular level of investment. The studies that
have been made of cyclical profit-investment relationships by Tinbergen,
Lawrence Klein and others areS not very helpful. Studies on an individual
firm basis, such as Modigliani is undertaking, may be more fruitful in
disclosing the relation of current and anticipated profits to investment
decisions. Until this type of analysis has progressed to the point that will
make valid generalizations possible, we shall have to rely on judgments
based primarily on historical experience.
We can, however, describe the profit-iiivestment relationship implied
by the projection techniques discussed above; and we can attempt to
postulate the conditions under which the relationship may or may not be
stable. The following discussion is based on the results that would be
obtained from application of these techniques to a projection of "expected"
profits and a sustainable level of investment in manufacturing.
An investment projection relating investment to changes in capacity,
and a profits projection based on the assumption of gross margins, would
indicate profits increasing relative to investment. The projected level of
investment would be lower in relation to the value of manufacturing out-
put, or total gross national product, than it has been during the past
Thisthesis has been elaborated by Benjamin Kaplan.
According to Lerner's formula for measuring the degree of monopoly —
prices minus marginal cost .
price which is roughly equivalent to the gross margin measure-
ment —thepostwar economy was more competitive than prewar. The degree of
monopoly in manufacturing was about 15 percent lower according to his formula.
in 1947 than in 1939. But, paradoxically, this could only come about with adminis-
tered pricing. Had producers priced by the rules of competition, prices and margins
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several years.'9 This is essentially because by 1949 capacity had in most
industries caught up with demand, and normal future growth in capacity
would therefore be slower. Moreover, if investment were assumed to rise
steadily over the period of the projection, say five years, it would have
to start from a lower base than the postwar peak.
The assumption of constant gross margins would result in profits rising
proportionately with full employment output, but there is some question
whether the base might not be appreciably lower than postwar profit
levels. If this were the case, profits could initially decline both in absolute
amount and in relation to investment. Several factors may have resulted in
higher profits during the postwar period than during a more "normal"
period of sustained prosperity. 1t has often been said that profits would
have to decline with the return of a buyer's market. If "return of a buyer's
market" means a general decline in demand, the statement may be true.
But in that case we would no longer be dealing with a full-employment
projection. And regardless of profits, investment would be expected
to decline below a sustainable rate. But "return of a buyer's market" may
also be taken to mean simply a return to more active competition. This
would mean lower pricing margins. However, as was indicated above,
there is no evidence that during the postwar period gross margins were
abnormally high; indeed in the bulk of manufacturing they were lower
than prewar.
On the other hand, a projection would not postulate price rises and
associated inventory profits like those of the postwar period. And if it were
assumed that capacity would not be quite as fully utilized as during 1947
and 1948, this would also make for somewhat smaller profit margins.
These factors, however, can be reasonably taken into account in a pro-
jection of expected profits. In the years 1947-49 corporate profits be-
fore taxes averaged about $17.1 billion annually, or about 9.2 percent of
sales. Adjusting for inventory revaluation, the estimates are $15.8 billion
and 8.5 percent respectively. In including 1949 in the average, we have
already made some allowance for a lower degree of capacity utilization.
But if the appropriate profit-sales ratio is in the neighborhood of 8 to
8½ percent, total projected profits before taxes would expand from a
base above the 1949 level.
Expected profits therefore would probably rise both in absolute
amount and in relation to projected investment. The following appear to
be the twO main grounds on which it could be argued that anticipated
profits would not furnish adequate incentives for the projected level of
investment:
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First,it could be argued that even if profits did rise beyond the 1949.
level, the postwar profit level itself was inadequate from an incentives
viewpoint. If this hypothesis is correct, the investment levels realized
during the postwar period must have been the result of temporary factors,
such as the need to make up accumulated wartime shortages, whose effect
outweighed those of inadequate profits. The authors know of no method
for proving or disproving this thesis.
It would be of some value to compare postwar with prewar invest-
ment-profit relationships, in particular. those of the late twenties. Unfor-
tunately, data for such a comparison are not available. Very rough
estimates indicate that manufacturing profits were somewhat lower relative
to investment in the postwar years than they were in 1927-29. But even
if refined estimates were available for both periods, we would not know
whether profits during the twenties were in excess of the amount required
for a sustainable level of investment. We only know that the level reached
during the period was not sustained.
Secondly, it also might be argued that the distribution of profits
among firms might not be such as to yield adequate investment incentives.
For example, earnings might be concentrated to a high degree, and re-
quired capacity increases be widespread. If this were the case there
might be some question of whether the distribution of projected invest-
ment involved an efficient allocation of resources. Therefore the distribu-
tion of profits is an important consideration in dealing with the incentives
problem. And it heightens the need for intensive industry and individual
firm studies.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that a profit-investment
relationship such as we have predicated may result in more than adequate
incentives for the realization .of a sustainable level of investment. This
would be the case if such a level of profits called forth a rate of investment
large enough to cause widespread excess capacity or a very high rate of
obsolescence. A profit-investment function of this character has been
postulated in a number of business cycle theories. Until more is known
about the factors governing investment decisions, however, we should
discount the possibility of over-stimulation of investment.
A more serious problem which such a hypothetical profit level might
pose is its relation to the other income shares from the point of view of
maintaining a full-employment level of consumption. Without a redistribu-
tion of the income shares favoring consumption —eitherthrough the price
mechanism or fiscal policy —theremay be some doubt whether consump-
tion would rise sufficiently to insure over-all stability. If it should not, the
problem of maintaining full employment would not be an easy one.112 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
It need not 'be emphasized that given the present state of our knowl-
edge, all the conclusions implied by these methods of projection are highly
conjectural.
V AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR INVESTMENT
Most full-employment models have dealt with the problem of availability
of funds only in terms of aggregates savings-investment relationships.
these models, a "shortage of funds" has meaning only in the very general
sense that the expected rate of total savings is smaller than the projected
level of investment. The possibility of shortages of particular types of
funds, or for particular types of business, is assumed away in the process
of netting out and aggregating savings. Aggregation assumes that different
types of savings are interchangeable, and that access to savings is de-
termined only by the profitability of investment. Within such a framework,
financial limitations cannot be important in explaining an under-employ-
ment equilibrium or an inadequate level of investment. Thus, except for
the case of a general shortage of funds for investment, the usual econom-
etric models do not allow for the possibility of investment being limited by
shortages of various types of funds.
One of the reasons for this oversight is that the Keynesian analysis,
on which these projections are generally based, deals with differences in
types of capital only in their effect on liquidity preference and the rate of
interest. The rate of interest itself is usually considered an unimportant
variable in the models, though not in the Keynesian theory. It can be
agreed that with some major exceptions interest rates do not play an im-
portant role in investment decisions. But the forms in which firms hold
their assets and liabilities, and the relative availability of different types
of funds, have an important direct effect on investment decisions, apart
from any effect they may exert via interest rates.
Such variables cannot be explicitly taken into account, however, in a
formulation solely in terms of aggregate savings-investment relationships.
Models, need to be set up which will recognize, first, major financial dif-
ferences between various sectors of the economy. So far as is statistically
possible, there should be separate accounts fOr households, farms, partner-
ships and proprietorships, business corporations, financial institutions, and
government. Analysis of the business sector, with which this paper is
primarily concerned, requires still further breakdown and will be dis-
cussed below.
A second major requirement is that models be set up in terms of various
types of income and financial flows rather than simply in terms of savings
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sources,their relative accessibility in equity and debt forms, the terms
and maturities on which credit is available, etc., all have important bearing
on investment decisions. These factors cannot be dealt with in the Keynes-
ian framework alone.
Satisfying these two requirements means setting up a sources and uses
of funds analysis for the various economic sectors. For the type of projec-
tions with which this paper is concerned, total financial requirements of a
sector would be based on the sector's "needed" level of investment in plant
and equipment and working capital. Next we should attempt to estimate
the general pattern of funds required to finance these "needed" investments
on a sustainable basis. Finally, if it were possible to make such projections
for all sectors of the economy —anadmittedly ambitious goal —theresult-
ing total requirements by types of funds could be compared with the pattern
of funds the economy might be expected to generate in the framework of
the model's assumptions. The supply side of the problem is taken up in
Mr. Jones' paper and is not explicitly dealt with here. One purpose of such
projections is to form a judgment on whether private investment is likely
to absorb all of the savings that the economy might make available to
it on a debt basis, under full-employment conditions. Another is to judge
whether the economy will generate a sufficient flow of equity capital to
finance the business investment needed for continued growth.
A sources-and-uses-by-sector analysis is conceptually similar to the
technique used in the Federal Reserve Board's moneyflows studies. The
moneyflows accounts are essentially sector sources and uses accounts.
They do not, however, segregate depreciation and other account items in
the manner shown in the Commerce statements. It would be useful if the
Commerce and Federal Reserve Board accounts were set up in such a
manner that they were completely reconcilable.
KOCH'S SOURCES AND USES PROJECTION
FOR MANUFACTURING
Mr. Koch's paper, "A Method of Projecting Expenditures and Financial
Requirements of Manufacturing Corporations under Full-Employment
Conditions," illustrates this type of analysis for a particular sector of the
economy —manufacturingcorporations. He has, first, projected the total
financial requirements of manufacturing corporations on the basis of fixed
and working capital outlays needed for the assumed rate of expansion of
their output and sales in a full-employment economy. As a second step,
he has estimated how much of their total financial requirements these cor-
porations might be able to satisfy from their internal sources of funds.
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sources, and the proportions needed in debt and equity forms, to enable
these corporations to maintain a "sound" financial position. All the items
in his projection are estimated on both a "high" and a "low" basis. In one
of his projections Mr. Koch has combined the high estimates for uses of
funds with the low for sources to get "maximum" outside financing
requirements.
The major purpose of these projections was to see how far one might go
in this sort of analysis on the basis of available techniques for projecting
sources and uses .of funds, available knowledge of the criteria for a desir-
able pattern of sources of funds, and available financial data.
These projections called for two major "financial" determinations:
1) the distribution of profits after taxes as between dividends and retained
earnings, and 2) the distribution of external financing as between equity
and debt. The total level of profits was estimated as constituting an "ex-
pected" rather than a "required" level.
Mr. Koch's projections assume that manufacturing corporations will
pay out in dividends two-thirds of their income after taxes, as compared
with about two-fifths of earnings actually so distributed over the past
several years. With considerably smaller total financial requirements, and
a relatively modest decline in total profits from levels of the past three
years, the assumption of a more generous dividend policy is reasonable.
However, it is difficult to judge on the basis of historical sources and uses
data available for the postwar years alone whether a 66 percent dividend-
profit ratio is more reasonable than a 50 percent or a 70 percent ratio.
To be sure, profits and dividends estimates extend back into the 1920's;
but without supplementary financial data there is little historical basis for
a projection of retained earnings. This is particularly disturbing in view
of the importance of this source of funds. One cannot claim, however, that
the problem would be easy, even were the historical data available.
The second major problem was to divide external financing require-
ments between debt and equity forms in a manner which would not
adversely affect, the postulated level of investment. The criterion selected
by Mr. Koch was a pattern of financing which would not worsen the
average debt-equity ratio of manufacturing corporations over the period
of the projection. What this means is that the corporations would need a
flow of external equity capital which would so supplement retained earn-
ings as to keep the over-all debt-equity ratio constant. Though the impor-
tance of the debt-equity ratio has been emphasized in financial literature,
there is some question as to whether investment decisions are made in
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ofa of debt or debt charges to profits, or in terms of some liquidity
ratio.
In extending this type of analysis, further breakdowns of sources of
funds would be desirable: for example, a division of total debt financing'
into short- and long-term. This might be done in terms of a liquidity cri-
terion utilizing available historical data.
THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION
One of the serious shortcomings of these projections, recognized and
emphasized in Mr. Koch's paper, is the bias imparted by aggregation in the
direction of understating financial limitations. Aggregation implies that the
projection will be representative of the adequacy of funds to all concerns
of a given sector. This is not an entirely realistic assumption. Some con-
cerns will be at a distinct disadvantage in their access to various types of
capital. There is no reason to assume that, with respect to over-all financial
limitations on investment, their deficiencies will be offset by surplus avail-
ability of funds to more fortunate firms.
Another method of approach would be to appraise the adequacy of
sources of capital solely by comparison with historical standards, rather
than in absolute terms as was done in Mr. Koch's projections. Then it
might reasonably be assumed that the distribution of firms around the
average, with respect to their financial positions, would be the same in the
future as it was in the past. There is at present, however, no way of check-
ing the validity of the assumption. Moreover, this type of analysis has
other serious shortcomings of its own.
One way to reduce the bias implicit in aggregation would be to work
in terms of smaller sectors, based on important financial differences among
various types of concerns. The most appropriate classification would be
by size of firm and by major industrial group. Available evidence strongly
indicates that differences in the availability of funds to individual firms
of a particular size group in any'industrial sector would be much smaller
than differences between smaller and larger concerns, or among firms in
different industrial sectors. Aside from improving the general reliability of
the projections, there is independent interest in attempting to measure the
relative inadequacy of various types of capital to smaller concerns, espe-
cially for purposes of economic policy.
•In a recent study, the Department of Economics of the McGraw-Hill
Publishing Company made some estimates of the needs of small and
medium-sized corporations for additional venture capital. It was con-
cluded that in 1947 and 1948 their deficiency amounted to $1.25 billion
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future prosperous year, these concerns would need $3.75billionannually
in additional venture capital. The estimates were arrived at by calculat-
ing the additional plant and equipment expenditures these companies
would have made, if their share of total manufacturing plant and equip-
ment expenditures during 1947 and 1948 had been proportional to their
share of total fixed assets. The difference between actual and calculated
expenditures was then imputed to a shortage of venture capital of the
same magnitude.
Some questionable assumptions are involved in these calculations. But
one point incidentally mentioned in the McGraw-Hill discussion would
seem particularly to merit further exploration. This is the suggestion that
new capital requirements of the smaller firms may be comparatively high
in proportion to their asset holdings, because these smaller size classes
must include more new and rapidly growing, firms.
It may be possible to set up this last statement in rough quantitative
terms. Such an attempt is obviously important if we are to gauge fairly
what part of total investment funds needs to be made available to new
and smaller businesses.
If "birth rates" and "death rates" of firms were uniform throughout
the whole gamut of sizes, maintenance of a constant degree of size inequal-
ity (or "concentration") among firms would call for a distribution of
investment corresponding to the distribution of capital assets among the
various size classes. Both the number and the average size of firms might
vary over time; but the concentration pattern, as shown for example by
a Lorenz curve, would remain the same.2° In order to reduce the degree of
concentration of capital assets, a more than proportionate rate of invest-
ment in the smaller21 size classes would be needed.
But even if the degree of concentration of assets is not to be reduced,
but left constant, realistic assumptions would still seem to require that
smaller firms get a bigger share of the total new investment than would
correspond to their share of total capital assets at any given time. There
are two reasons for this: 1) Most firms start small,22 and 2) business
mortality is much higher among smaller firms.
20Wehave not attempted to work out a mathematical proof of this statement, but
it seems inherently reasonable.
21"Smaller"in this discussion should be interpreted in a relative sense, referring,
say, to the ,lower dediles or percentiles of the size array. With changing price levels
and an expanding economy, any comparison of size distributions based on the same
set of absolute size classes at two different dates can be seriously misleading.
The average initial investment of manufacturing firms in the period 1946-48
was only $12,000. Corresponding figures for new wholesale and retail firms in
1945-47 are $22,000 and $9,500 respectively. For further details see LawrencePROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 117
Both observations are well known, and susceptible of measurement.
With appropriate statistical data, it should be possible to work out the
quantitative relations between required rates of investment to establish
new firms of various sizes, of investment to expand existing firms of vari-
ous sizes, and the resulting distribution of capital assets by size classes.
An over-all business investment requirement might thus be broken down
to show subtotals for small business and/or new business.
Appropriate allowance would have to .be made, of course, for growth
by mergers and for the transfer of capital assets of liquidated firms.
It must also be recognized that this problem in vital statistics isnot
likely to have a unique solution, particularly from the public policy stand-
point. There remains the question of whether we want the degree of
concentration of capital assets to rise, stay constant, or fall. Moreover,
any program to aid small business might be expected to hav'e the follow-
ing three effects, each of which may work in the direction of reduced
concentration: (a) raising the business "birth rate"; (b) reducing "infant
mortality"; (c) encouraging the faster expansion of small firms.
Statistical analysis alone will not indicate how much emphasis "ought"
to be put on each of these three effects.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The previous discussion has centered largely on the problem of setting up
a projection of sources of funds that would be consistent with a sustainable
level of business investment. A second major problem is to inquire
whether the needed sources of funds would likely be available to the
sector in question, given the general assumptions of the projection. One
method of handling this problem —andthis was essentially the method
Mr. Koch used —isto compare the needed sources of funds with their
availability historically. This approach must be used if the projections
cover only a single economic sector. However, in dealing with a large
economic sector, judging availability by historical comparison is a some-
what questionable procedure. Account also must be taken of the require-
ments of other economic sectors, and of the availability of funds to them.
In other words, an adequate analysis of the availability of funds to a
particularsector involves, as was mentioned earlier in this discussion,
extension of the analysis to the entire economy and setting up compre-
hensive sources and uses accounts. At the present time, the limitations of
Bridge and Lois E. Holmes, "Capital Requirements of New Manufacturing Firms,"
Survey of Current Business, April 1950, and Lawrence Bridge, "Capital Require-
ments of New Trade Firms," Survey of Current Business, December 1948.118 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
data plus a great number of unsolved theoretical problems preclude such
an ambitious undertaking.
In the remainder of this section, we shall indicate some of the addi-
tional types of financial data and studies of financial factors governing
investment decisions which are needed to refine our concept of a desirable
pattern of sources of funds within the corporate sector of the economy.
At the present time, the only historical data on corporate sources and uses
covering more than the postwar period is the Commerce series for total
nonfinancial corporations. As was indicated above, what we most need by
way of historical data is a breakdown of this series by major industrial
group and by size of firm. Without it, analysis of the problem of avail-
ability of funds cannot be carried very far.
In additipn, there are several ways in which the details appearing in
published sources and uses data might be further extended and supple-
mented to make them more useful for purposes of analysis. In the first
place, it might be possible to provide a more detailed identification of the
sources of outside funds. This would be particularly useful in attempting
to relate the pattern of demand to the supply of funds flowing through
financial institutions or provided directly by other sectors of the noncor-
porate economy. For recent years, at least, the Business Structure Division
of the Department of Commerce has prepared estimates of net new secu-
rity issues purchased by various types of financial institutions, individuals,
and others. A series of this character, going back into the twenties, espe-
cially if it could be broken down into stock and bond issues, would be very
valuable. It would also be desirable to loans and mortgages broken
down according to type of purchasing institutions.
Another analytically useful means of classifying outside financing is
by the terms on which the funds were obtained: interest rates, maturities
and type of security offered by borrower on loans, and costs of flotations
on security issues. The 1946 Federal Reserve Board bank loan study did
break down outstanding loans of member banks in terms of these vari-
ables, and by size of borrower as well. Such data should be related to
sources and uses statements by size of borrower. Though it would be
statistically impossible to construct a comprehensive historical series of
this character, sample studies of particular industries probably could be
undertaken.
For analytical purposes it would also be extremely helpful if financial
flows estimates were available on a gross as well as on a net basis. Short-
term analysis, particularly, could go much further if it were possible to
distinguish between gross and net changes in various asset and liability
items, as we can with only one at the present time —securityissues. GrossPROJECTING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 119
flowestimates could not, of course, be derived from accounting data or
from monetary statistics. It is to be hoped that in the future some of our
imaginative statisticians will devote themselves to the problem of measur-
ing gross financial flows.
In stressing the need for additional historical data, we do not wish to
imply that their accumulation would solve all of our difficulties. Our main
handicap in dealing with the "financeability" of a sustainable level of in-
vestment is our inadequate knowledge of the character of the functional
relationships between "financial" factors and investment decisions. We
need to know the effect of the forms in which business firms hold their
assets and liabilities, in particular the effect of their liquidity, on invest-
ment decisions; the influence on investment decisions of the relative costs
and availability of debt and equity capital; the meaning of the "cost" of
equity capital; and the importance for investment decisions of the relative
availability of capital in external and internal forms. A good deal more
empirical research will be required before such considerations can be
adequately dealt with in economic projections.
VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To estimate the business financial requirements implied by a projection
of sustained economic expansion, one must take into account the manifold
interdependence between business investment and other components of
the economy's structure. Among the important relationships to be evalu-
ated are:
IThe relation of business investment to increased and
demand
2 The relation of projected investment to business incentives, in
terms of both total and distributed earnings
3Requirements of funds for investment, in relation not merely to
total savings but also to the availability of specific forms of savings.
Adequacy of funds means that enough savings be available to specific
types of business in such specific forms as short-term credit, long-term
credit, external equity investment, and retained business profits. The
supply of these various forms of saving, and the respective needs
therefor, will depend on the distribution of personal and business
income and on the development of financial institutions and practices.
It is only too clear that a comprehensive econometric analysis, in-
volving simultaneous incorporation of all the relevant interrelationships
in a calculation of business financial requirements, would call for an ex-120 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
tremely complex dynamic model of the economy. Further refinement and
testing of economic models will certainly be useful, but we feel that results
of practical significance in the foreseeable future can best be sought by
less elegant procedures. Much useful present knowledge of the factors
determining saving, investment, and financial practices would have to be
sacrificed if a solution were sought in the framework of a formal mathe-
matical model.
In Part 1 of this paper we have set forth a number of suggestions for
possible further analysis, using basic data which either already exist or
could be brought to hand. Part 2, by Aibert R. Koch, is presented as an
illustration of the possibilities and limitations of quantitative investment
projection in a specific field of business on the basis of data and procedures
now available.